The spacecraft designers worried about two mechanical aspects of the antenna. One was the tip off transient at initial deployment where the concern was dynamic shock to the spacecraft. A finite element model developed by the antenna manufacturer, Northrop Gnunman -Astro Aerospace, produced the prelcted shock spectrum. Spacecraft dynamics experts determined there was no threat. The second worry was the deployed natural frequency which had to be greater than 0.05 Hz in order io not interfere with spacecraft attitude control. The aforementioned finite element model together with vibration tests produced an answer of about 0.08 Hz. However, it took about a year and a half to resolve the residual concerns given the criticality of this parameter.
Meanwhile, no one worried about the approximately one minute of the actual deployment transient. Each 20 m boom had mass of 1-kg. The structure was so large and light, there was no real way to test it in Earth gravity and atmosphere. Astro Aerospace developed a simulation program to model the deployment transient. The result appeared sufficiently benign that no one actually questioned the validity of the model. In April 2004, while working with a deployment simulation of the antenna for the SHARAD instrument (SHAllow RADar, an instrument on NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter), an error in the way damping was modeled in the software was discovered. When corrections were made to the MARSIS deployment model, the results were highly chaotic and so different from the previous results that proceeding with MARSIS deployment at that time would have been irresponsible. The Mars Express-NASA Project Manager notified ESA of the need to postpone the scheduled deployment. As it happened, this realization and notification took place a mere 12 hours before ESA was to load the deployment sequence aboard the spacecraft.
The expected science value was such the deployment was very desirable. JPL spent the next four weeks attempting to identify and solve the problems. At a review with ESTEC on May 14, 2004, it became apparent that too little was actually known about the real deployment expectations and the mechanical properties to proceed. JPL then put together what amounted to a retroactive qualification effort, considering the flight article was already at Mars and only the Engineering Model was available to test. This effort will be described later.
D. Spacecraft Constraints
Eric? Impact on the SC attitude control during and after the deployment; resulting attitude controllers for the whole Initial risk assessment Basic requirements for characterization of the deployment deployment phase.
E. Operations and Commissioning Constraints
Alan M.? (also include the trade-off on the deployment target date as early / as late as possible: science demo phase for the optical instruments just after Mars arrival, concerns of the other PIS, maximum eclipse duration.. .) 
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C. Boom Deployment Studies
One of the key issues with a lightweight, large motion, and highly dynamic deployment such as MARSIS is that friction, gravity, and aerodynamic resistance forces will dominate any attempts at ground based testing. The boom is extremely light weight and its properties are also temperature dependent. As a result of the influence of these forces it impossible to test the full system behavior prior to flight and we must rely on analysis to predict the deployment dynamics. Due to the infeasibility of a full system test, a computational study was used to detemine the critical controlling parameters of the deployment which resulted in narrowing the planned component testing to three major parameters: the hinge buckling strength, the hinge torque profile, and the stowed compressive energy.
The hinge buckling strength was measured using sections of the flight spare boom in a four-point bending fixture. Results from this test indicated that the in-situ hinge strength of the flight booms was lower than previous measurements had suggested and that buckling could occur both in the hinge section and in the material immediately adjacent to the hinges. Additionally, the hinge deployment torque was measured in an environmental chamber at its on-orbit temperature of -70 C to better characterize its contribution to the deployment energy as well as the hysteresis energy dissipation associated with any hinge buckling events. Finally, the stowed energy due to the compression of the tube diameter in the cradle was measured in a vacuum chamber at -70 C for all three booms.
The boom deployments were simulated using a highly specialized ADAMS model. The model was constructed with 13 straight segments connected by spline hinge joints that reproduced the measured hinge torque profile and buckling strengths. Each of the 13 straight segments was composed of two beam elements that employed an automated algorithm to update the structural (stifhess proportional Rayleigh) damping parameter based on the local straight section beam length and end conditions. Finally, the accordion style stowed state was modeled with gap springs connecting adjacent boom segments in order to capture the stowed compressive energy.
A total of 1000 cases of the ADAMS model were run in a Monte Carlo study of the deployment dynamics. One of the key results from the Monte Carlo analysis was the discovery that a number of scenarios were possible that could result in the boom re-contacting the spacecraft during the deployment. Due to the high compressive energy the dipole boom reaches its full 20 m length in about 2.5 seconds, after which, it typically experiences a "whip" type behavior and tends to fold back towards the spacecraft in two or more sections. The margin against boom re-contact was quantified based on the closest buckled hinge after the full length of the boom was reached and it was exhibiting recoiling motion.
Results from the Monte Carlo study indicated that there was a significant probability that the MARSIS booms could contact the spacecraft or solar arrays during the deployment. Based on this result, a failure modes analysis was done at ESA using the energies and incidence angles obtained from the Monte Carlo m s . The conclusion of this analysis was that, while significant damage to the spacecraft was possible, the likelihood of it occurring was very low. Hence, the decision was made to proceed with the deployment.
D. Spacecraft Protection Strategy
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E. Operations Coordination and In-flight Tests
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F. Operational Timeline Preparation
Zeina? One radar at Mars, two 20-meter long "jacks-in-the-box",three critical deployments in the middle of a successful mission: In the frame of the first European planetary mission, the deployment of the MARSIS antennas onboard the ESA Mars Express spacecraft has been itself a dedicated mission. While Mars Express was already performing regular observations at Mars, a complex process has been performed on Earth, involving the ESA Project, coordination between ESA, NASA and ASI, the Mars Science community, the spacecraft manufacturer EADS Astrium and the Mission Control Centre at ESOC. JPL, provider of the antenna booms for the Italian instrument MARSIS, called off the deployment in April 2004, due to a newly identified risk of a boom hitting the spacecraft. Further mechanical studies and simulations took months due to the complexity of this non-deterministic problem. In parallel, finding a new deployment window had to perform a trade-off between operational constraints and science requirements of the teams who wanted to minimize the impact on the scientific coverage. Meanwhile, the MARSIS team was eager to deploy as soon as possible.
G. Preparation and Verification of Attitude Control Products
A GO for deployment was reached only in 2005. Risk analyses recommended safing measures to minimize potential impact on vital spacecraft elements and to verify its health and configuration after the deployment of each boom, which vastly increased the operational complexity. A simulations campaign in April 2005 prepared the mission team for these critical operations, while a flight pre-deployment test campaign was executed in the gaps not used by the science mission.
The first deployment firing occurred successfully on May 4*, 2005. During the subsequent precise spacecraft dynamics characterization, it was discovered that the 20-meter boom was not fully extended but bent at two thirds of its length. A strategy was developed to obtain full deployment of the boom, which was achieved thanks to a controlled warming-up by the Sun of the problematic hinge. However, this unexpected failure mode could have occurred on hinges closer to the spacecraft, which may have resulted in loss of controllability and danger to the mission.
Operations management had to trade-off between resuming the mission, antenna half-deployed and without MARSIS, on robust but inaccurate attitude controllers, or talung the risk to deploy the second long boom. At this time, and unrelated to MARSIS, a minor wheel electronics glitch occurred, during the recovery of which the spacecraft ended up on thruster control, with such poor pointing performance that communications with the spacecraft were not reliable. The anomaly was fixed "in the blind" and good communications recovered. It was decided to continue. The second 20-meter boom was successfully deployed on June 14"; the third boom, only seven A.
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Final Preparation (2004-2005): To Deploy or Not to Deploy
I. Introduction
<copied from the Abstract, to be streamlined> One radar at Mars, two 20-meter long 'tjacks-in-the-box", three critical deployments in the middle of a successful mission: In the frame of the first European planetary mission, the deployment of the MARSIS antennas onboard the ESA Mars Express spacecraft has been itself a dedicated mission. While Mars Express was already performing regular observations at Mars, a complex process has been performed on Earth, involving the ESA Project, coordination between ESA, NASA and ASI, the Mars Science community, the spacecraft manufacturer EADS Astriuni and the Mission Control Centre at ESOC.
JF'L, provider of the antenna booms for the Italian instrument MARSIS, called off the deployment in April 2004
, due to a newly identified risk of a boom hitting the spacecraft. Further mechanical studies and simulations took months due to the complexity of this non-deterministic problem. In parallel, finding a new deployment window had to perform a trade-off between operational constraints and science requirements of the teams who wanted to minimize the impact on the scientific coverage. Meanwhile, the MARSIS team was eager to deploy as soon as possible.
The first deployment firing occurred successfully on May 4", 2005. During the subsequent precise spacecraft dynamics characterization, it was discovered that the 20-meter boom was not fully extended but bent at two thirds of its length. A strategy was developed to obtain full deployment of the boom, which was achieved thanks to a controlled warming-up by the Sun of the problematic hinge. However, this unexpected failure mode could have occurred on hinges closer to the spacecraft, which may have resulted in loss of controllability and danger to the mission.
Operations management had to trade-off between resuming the mission, antenna half-deployed and without MARSIS, on robust but inaccurate attitude controllers, or taking the risk to deploy the second long boom. At this time, and unrelated to MARSIS, a minor wheel electronics glitch occurred, during the recovery of which the spacecraft ended up on thruster control, with such poor pointing performance that communications with the spacecraft were not reliable. The anomaly was fixed "in the blind" and good communications recovered. It was decided to continue. The second 20-meter boom was successfully deployed on June 14"; the third boom, only seven meters long, on June 17" 2005. All fully extended!
Project History (1998-2004): A Radar At Mars, Why And How
This chapter describes the design and time logic that flows from the science objectives of Mars Express and Marsis to the solutions retained for constructing, mounting and deploying the booms. The MARSIS antenna faced a serious design challenge: namely to produce a 40 m dipole and a 7 m monopole that fit within a modest stored volume, a tight mass constraint, and when deployed would exhibit a first mode natural frequency of at least 0.05 Hz. The solution was a tubular structure made of fiber glass layers and Kevlar composites. The dipole booms were each 20 m long and 3.8 cm in diameter. The monopole was 7 m long and 2.0 cm in diameter. The tubes were folded into 1.5 m segments at 13 hinge points made of cut outs in the tube walls. Each dipole boom was folded into a volume of about half of its uncompressed state. The resulting compressed stored energy was to become a major driver for the deployment dynamics.
The spacecraft designers worried about two mechanical aspects of the antenna. One was the tip off transient at initial deployment where the concern was dynamic shock to the spacecraft. A finite element model developed by the antenna manufacturer, Northrop Grurnman -Astro Aerospace, produced the predicted shock spectrum. Spacecraft dynamics experts determined there was no threat. The second worry was the deployed natural frequency which had to be greater than 0.05 Hz in order to not interfere with spacecraft attitude control. The aforementioned finite element model together with vibration tests produced an answer of about 0.08 Hz. However, it took about a year and a half to resolve the residual concerns given the criticality of this parameter.
Meanwhile, no one worried about the approximately one minute of the actual deployment transient. Each 20 m boom had mass of 1-kg. The structure was so large and light, there was no real way to test it in Earth gravity and atmosphere. Astro Aerospace developed a simulation program to model the deployment transient. The result appeared sufficiently benign that no one actually questioned the validity of the model. In April 2004, while working with a deployment simulation of the antenna for the SHARAD instrument (SHAllow RADar, an instrument on NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter), an error in the way damping was modeled in the software was discovered. When corrections were made to the MARSIS deployment model, the results were highly chaotic and so different from the previous results that proceeding with MARSIS deployment at that time would have been irresponsible. The Mars Express-NASA Project Manager notified ESA of the need to postpone the scheduled deployment. As it happened, this realization and notification took place a mere 12 hours before ESA was to load the deployment sequence aboayd the spacecraft.
D. Spacecraft Constraints
Eric? Impact on the SC attitude control during and after the deployment; resulting attitude controllers for the whole Initial risk assessment Basic requirements for characterization of the deployment deployment phase. 
E. Operations and Commissioning Constraints
C. Boom Deployment Studies
One of the key issues with a lightweight, large motion, and highly dynamic deployment such as MARSIS is that friction, gravity, and aerodynamic resistance forces will dominate any attempts at ground based testing. The boom is extremely light weight and its properties are also temperature dependent. As a result of the influence of these forces it impossible to test the full system behavior prior to flight and we must rely on analysis to predict the deployment dynamics. Due to the infeasibility of a full system test, a computational study was used to determine the critical controlling parameters of the deployment which resulted in narrowing the planned component testing to three major parameters: the hinge buckling strength, the hinge torque profile, and the stowed compressive energy.
The boom deployments were simulated using a highly specialized ADAMS model. The model was constructed with 13 straight segments connected by spline hinge joints that reproduced the measured hinge torque profile and buckling strengths. Each of the 13 straight segments was composed of two beam elements that employed an automated algorithm to update the structural (stiffness proportional Rayleigh) damping parameter based on the local straight section beam length and end conditions. Finally, the accordion style stowed state was modeled with gap springs connecting adjacent boom segments in order to capture the stowed compressive energy.
Results froim the Monte Carlo study indicated that there was a significant probability that the MARSIS booms could contact the spacecraft or solar arrays during the deployment. Based on this result, a failure modes analysis was done at ESA using the energies and incidence angles obtained from the Monte Carlo runs. The conclusion of this analysis vvas that, while significant damage to the spacecraft was possible, the likelihood of it occurring was very low. Hence, the decision was made to proceed with the deployment.
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